May 10, 2024
A recent proposed rule from the U.S. Department of the Treasury aims to enhance CFIUS’s ability to request information from parties, increase potential penalty amounts, and expedite mitigation agreement negotiations. Similarly, a new GAO study reveals CFIUS’s enforcement priorities and increasing reliance on mitigation agreements to address national security concerns.
On April 11, 2024, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”), as Chair of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS” or “the Committee”) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (the “Proposed Rule”) that proposes to expand the types of information CFIUS may request in the course of non-notified reviews, add a time limit for parties to respond to mitigation agreement drafts, and raise the maximum penalty amount that Committee may impose for CFIUS violations (including violations of mitigation agreements), among other changes.
Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) publicly released a report outlining its findings concerning the Committee’s use of mitigation agreements, coordination of enforcement decisions, and staffing resources, along with recommendations for certain enhancements.
Together, the Proposed Rule and the GAO report underscore the increasing prominence of CFIUS and signal an expansion of the Committee’s monitoring and enforcement capabilities. We summarize key aspects of both below.
Proposed Rule to Expand CFIUS’s Monitoring and Enforcement Capabilities
The Proposed Rule would expand the types of information that CFIUS can require transaction parties and other persons to submit. Current regulations permit CFIUS to request parties provide information necessary for the Committee to determine if a non-notified transaction constitutes a “covered transaction” under Part 800 or a “covered real estate transaction” under Part 802 of the CFIUS regulations. The Proposed Rule would authorize the Committee to issue requests more broadly to transaction parties and other persons for information to determine if a transaction (i) meets the criteria for a mandatory declaration and/or (ii) raises national security concerns. This expanded scope of information requests would, according to CFIUS, enhance the Committee’s ability to engage in preliminary fact-finding and further help determine whether to request transaction parties submit a declaration or notice for review.
The Proposed Rule also expands CFIUS’s ability to require parties to provide information to the Committee in two situations post-CFIUS review:
While such information is already routinely requested by the Committee, the Proposed Rule formalizes the current practice and explicitly obligates parties to respond. Additionally, the Proposed Rule changes the condition for the Committee to request such information from “[i]f deemed necessary by the Committee” to “[i]f deemed appropriate by the Committee,” thereby lowering the threshold for such information requests. As with the current rule, a subpoena may be issued to non-compliant parties, but the Proposed Rule specifically assigns this power to the Staff Chairperson (as opposed to the Committee as a whole) to increase operational efficiency.
As discussed at greater length below, in recent years, CFIUS has increasingly imposed mitigation agreements on transaction parties in order to address alleged national security concerns. While the current regulations require parties to respond to follow-up information requests from CFIUS within three business days during the course of a transaction review, the regulations are silent on the timeframe within which parties must respond to mitigation proposals or revisions, including in the context of non-notified reviews. The Proposed Rule recognizes that in some cases, particularly in situations where transactions have already closed, parties are less motivated to respond in a timely manner without a clear obligation. Accordingly, the Proposed Rule creates a similar deadline of three business days for parties to provide substantive responses to proposed mitigation terms, though, as with responses to follow-up information requests, the CFIUS Staff Chairperson may grant reasonable extensions on a case-by-case basis. Substantive responses include acceptance of terms as proposed, counterproposals, or a detailed statement of reasons explaining why a party or parties cannot comply with the terms as proposed (which may also include a counterproposal). If parties fail to respond within the prescribed timeframe, the Committee may reject the notice or declaration.
The Proposed Rule notes a significant drop in the median value of covered transactions filed with CFIUS pursuant to a joint voluntary notice following the implementation of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 and the introduction of mandatory declarations. According to the Committee, the relatively low value of many transactions undermines the current penalty framework of imposing fines of up to greater of $250,000 or the value of the transaction. For example, for certain transactions with reported low values (or even a valuation of zero dollars), the maximum penalty de facto becomes $250,000, which the Committee considers an insufficient deterrent in many instances. Consequently, the Proposed Rule would, for the first time in 15 years, increase and expand the maximum civil penalties as follows:
Written comments to the Proposed Rule must be received by Wednesday, May 15, 2024, by mail or submitted electronically at Regulations.gov. After such comments are received and reviewed, Treasury is expected to issue a final rule in short order.
GAO Report Provides Insight into CFIUS Mitigation Agreements and Makes Related Recommendations to Standardize Certain Processes
On April 18, 2024, GAO publicly released a report evaluating issues related to CFIUS mitigation agreements and staffing and offered targeted recommendations for improvement.
First, GAO recommended two changes related to CFIUS’s process for handling mitigation agreements:
Second, GAO recommends CFIUS take three actions to evaluate the level of staffing devoted to mitigation agreements:
Apart from these recommendations, the GAO report provides key insights into CFIUS’s use of mitigation agreements and the Committee’s enforcement priorities, including the following:
Both the Proposed Rule and the findings in the GAO report exemplify the increasingly robust role CFIUS plays in aggressively monitoring and shaping foreign direct investment in the United States. In light of these efforts and the increasing costs of non-compliance, transaction parties should carefully evaluate transactions involving foreign person investors, directly or indirectly, for CFIUS risks even in the early stages of deal discussions. CFIUS’s role and impact are poised only to increase as Treasury finalizes the Proposed Rule and the Committee ramps up its enforcement efforts.
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